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DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSING LAW AND
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR NEW
YORK CITY RESIDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
John P. Herrion

Persons with disabilities are forced to deal with many difficulties
in their everyday life and unable to enjoy things ordinarily taken
for granted. One example is the discrimination they face in their
living conditions. Due to the way in which many buildings are constructed, persons with disabilities are prevented from freely using
and enjoying their home. In an attempt to cure this problem, the
New York Human Rights Law (the "NYC Law") 1 was enacted.
The NYC Law prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a
housing accommodation and provides persons with disabilities with
the right to request and receive reasonable accommodations from
their housing providers.' The law's complete scope and meaning
have yet to be completed determined, though.
This Essay examines the NYC Law as well as its interpretation
and enforcement by the New York City Commission on Human
Rights (the "Commission"). More specifically, it focuses on specific rulings where housing providers were ordered to furnish reasonable accommodations for residents with disabilities. This Essay
concludes that although certain matters about the NYC Law are
still unsettled, the Commission's recent interpretation of it is a step
in the right direction for persons with disabilities and toward removing unnecessary discrimination from their lives.
The NYC Law is similar to the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968
(the "FHA") 3 and the New York State Human Rights Law (the
"State Law"). 4 The FHA and the State Law prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities in the sale or rental of a dwelling unit.' They regulate application criteria, additional rental
charges, security deposits, and many other areas in which people
with disabilities are treated differently in their attempt to secure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101 to 8-131 (1996).
See id. § 8-107(5).
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1999).
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1998).
See 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(5).

1295

1296

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII

housing. 6 Both laws also prohibit a housing provider from refusing
to permit reasonable modifications of existing premises, at the expense of the individual with a disability, where such modifications
would be necessary to afford full use and enjoyment of the premises.' The FHA and the State Law add, however, that when a lease
is terminated, landlords of rental occupancies may require the interior of the premises to be restored to its original condition, at the
expense of the tenant with a disability.8
The NYC Law also forbids housing providers from refusing to
sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, or otherwise deny or
withhold an interest therein from any person or group of persons,
based upon a disability. 9 It prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in the terms, conditions or privileges of the
sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation, or in the
furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith. 10 The
law's protection extends to privately-owned and publicly-funded
housing including, but not limited to, condominiums, cooperatives
and rental apartments. 1
In addition, the NYC Law requires housing providers to make
reasonable accommodations to enable a person with a disability to
enjoy the right or rights in question, provided that the disability is
known or should have been known. 2 "Reasonable accommodation" is defined as that which can be made that shall not cause
undue hardship in the conduct of the covered entity's business. 3
The factors by which undue hardship is determined include the nature and cost of the accommodation, the overall financial resources
of the facility involved, as well as the effect on the expenses, resources, and operation of the facility involved.' n The NYC Law
includes an affirmative defense, however, when the housing provider can prove that the person aggrieved would not be able to use
or enjoy the residence, regardless of any accommodations made.' 5
Conspicuously missing from the NYC Law is any requirement or
obligation upon the person with a disability to pay for or provide
6. See Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority, 748 F. Supp 1002 (W.D.N.Y.
1990).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(18).
8. See statutes cited supra note 7.
9. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5) (1998).
10. See id.
11. See id. § 8-102(10).
12. See id. § 8-107(15)(a).
13. See id. § 8-102(18).
14. See id. § 8-102(18)(a)-(b).
15. See id. § 8-107(15)(b).
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the necessary accommodation. In fact, the statute is completely silent on the matter. This omission creates a large distinction between the provisions of the NYC Law and those of the FHA and
the State Law, 6 and has raised many questions as to who should
actually bear the cost of providing the accommodation.
United Veterans Mutual Housing No. 2 Corp. v. New York City
Commission on Human Rights," in which the Appellate Division
upheld a determination by the Commission that compelled the implementation of a nondiscrimination policy in particular housing
accommodations, tested the difference between the separate
laws. 18 The complainant in United Veterans required a ramp to get
into and out of her cooperative. 19 The respondents refused to provide one, however, contending that the FHA preempts local law
from dealing with the issue of reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities in their residences.2 0 In a suit for discrimination, the court ordered the housing provider to abandon its policy
of refusing to reasonably accommodate the needs of its disabled
residents.
In its decision, the court also clarified the relationship between
the NYC Law and the FHA by explaining that the FHA does not
preempt local law from dealing with the issue of reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals in their residences. 21 Furthermore, the court stated that the provisions of the NYC Law do not
conflict with the FHA because both make it unlawful for any person or entity to refuse to make reasonable accommodations to provide a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling unit.22 Therefore, the court found that the cooperative's
policy of "refusing to expend corporate funds to construct, modify,
maintain or insure any improvements to the common grounds or
other common areas" at issue to accommodate the needs of its residents with disabilities violated both the FHA and the NYC Law. 3
In addition to its other claims, the respondents in United Veterans argued that forcing them to pay for modifications to the building that would solely benefit one resident violated the Due Process
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
616
See
See
See
See
See
Id.

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(A); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1.8) (McKinney 1999).
N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1994).
id. at 85.
id.
id.
id.
id.

1298

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII

and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution.24
The court denied this contention, however, by explaining that
"[l]egislation which is designed to prevent discrimination in general
and protect the disabled in particular is intended to promote the
general welfare of the community. '25 The court continued to say
that "legislation designed to promote the
general welfare com26
monly burdens some more than others.
In 1997, the Commission upheld the ruling in United Veterans in
27 The complainant in
Torres v. Prince Management Corporation.
that case was the mother of two disabled children, neither of whom
could use the primary entrance of their building because the steps
prohibited access for wheelchairs.28 The basement door had a
ramped entrance, but it was locked between the hours of 5:00 PM
and 8:00 AM and the respondents refused to provide the mother
with a key.29 Therefore, she and her children were prevented from
independently entering or exiting their home.3" Even if they were
given a key, the basement ramp was not compliant with regulations
for wheelchair accessibility.31
The Commission ordered that a wheelchair accessible ramp be
installed at the basement entrance, and that respondents provide
twenty-four hour access to the building be made to the Torres family.32 In addition, the judge found that Mrs. Torres and her children suffered mental anguish as a result of the unlawful refusal to
provide reasonable access by the respondent, and awarded them
$70,000. 3 3 This decision represents the level to which the Commission would rise in ensuring that housing providers be accountable
for their discriminatory actions against people with disabilities.
The ruling also continues to set a precedent that such actions would
not be tolerated under the NYC Law.3 4
24. See id. at 86.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133
(1978)); see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Atchison T & S.F.R.
Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
27. OATH Index #301/98 (Aug. 14, 1997), affd sub noma. Prince Management
Corp v. Varela, N.Y. L.J., July 29, 1998, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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Recently, the Commission again placed New York City housing
providers on notice that they are not insulated from the obligations
of the NYC Law. In Raymond v. 325 Cooperative, Inc.,35 the Commission ordered a cooperative to pay for and provide a ramp to the
primary entrance of the building, and to install automatic door
openers for the front entrance and the elevator.36 The exterior design of the building in that case was not uncommon for New York
City.37 It featured a short bridge that was constructed over a moat,
which had two exterior steps leading to the lobby door.38 In 1995,
the cooperative was aware that the bridge needed structural repair
work and started securing bids and designs for the construction.39
At that time, Ms. Raymond requested that the Board also consider
building a ramp for the entranceway.4 ° Initially, the Board was
agreeable and hired an architect to provide designs for an accessible entranceway. 41 For two years, the cooperative reviewed plans
and bids for the work, entertaining designs for both the reconstruction of the bridge and stairs, and for a ramped entranceway.42
At a shareholders meeting held in 1997, however, shareholders
raised several objections to the ramp design.43 These objections
ranged from cost concerns to certain shareholders' desire to not
have their building "look like a hospital."' 44 As a result, the Board
and the shareholders voted against the ramp design and approved
the reconstruction of the bridge and stairs to the entrance of the
building. 45 Despite Ms. Raymond's offers to pay for the ramp herself, the Board disregarded her requests and decided to proceed
with the construction without installing a ramp.46
Ms. Raymond filed a complaint with the Commission, which subsequently found probable cause by crediting Ms. Raymond's allegations that the cooperative was discriminating against her.47
Following the probable cause determination the Board reconvened
35. 1999 WL 156021 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts. Jan. 12, 1999), affd 1999 WL 152526
(N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts.).
36. See id. at *1.
37. See id. at *1.
38. See id. at *2.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at *3.
42. See id.
43. See id. at *1.
44. See id. at *4.

45. See id.
46. See id. Other than the date that Ms. Raymond requested the accommodation,
the facts were not in dispute. See id. at *7.
47. See id. at *7.
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to address the issue of access for their building.4 8 The Board offered to accommodate Ms. Raymond by providing an exterior lift
that would lower her and her wheelchair into the moat by the basement entrance, where Ms. Raymond could then navigate her way
to the building's interior elevator.4 9 The Commission found this
offer disingenuous, however, and increased the award of damages
to Ms. Raymond by $5000.0
Aside from punishing the housing providers, the increased
amount of damages represented the Commission's intent to assure
that Ms. Raymond's access to the building was equal to her neighbors. 5' Under the NYC Law, the Commission is given the authority to require respondents to take affirmative action including the
extension of "full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges. 5 2 It recognized that having to
be lowered into the moat and only gaining access through the basement door was more disheartening to Ms. Raymond than having to
rely on the assistance of others to climb the stairs and get into her
building as it was presently constructed.5 3 The Commission found
the cooperative's offer of an exterior lift to be unequal and segregated for Ms. Raymond and, therefore, increased the compensatory damages.
The Raymond case was reported in the New York Times as a
"wake up call" to New York City building owners, cooperative
boards and condominium boards. 4 It served as a warning that
they will be held accountable for their actions should they discriminate against any tenants and shareholders with disabilities.
This type of wake up call should not be necessary though. The
NYC Law has prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities for over twenty-five years. What has changed, however, is
that the Commission has distinguished New York City from the
rest of the country in its attack on unlawful discrimination against
48. See id.
49. See id. at *5.
50. The Administrative Law Judge initially recommended $10,000 damages to
compensate Ms. Raymond for her pain and suffering. See id. at *12. Upon review of
the record and considering Ms. Raymond's testimony with regard to the Board's offer, the Commission raised the amount to $15,000.00. See 1999 WL 152526, at *2.
51. See id. at *7-8.
52. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120(a)(5) (1999).
53. See 1.999 WL 156021, at *11.
54. See Jay Romano, Your Home; A Ruling on Co-ops and Disability,N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1999 at 3.
55. See id.
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people with disabilities. Similar to other federal56 and state laws57
that require covered entities to reasonable accommodate the needs
of persons with disabilities, the NYC Law's obligation to provide
reasonably accommodations is balanced by the undue hardship
test.5 8 If the requested accommodation creates an undue hardship,
whether it be financial or otherwise, it is not considered reasonable
and is no longer required by law.5 9 Where, however, the accommodation does not result in an undue hardship, the Commission has
made it compellingly clear that under the NYC Law, the housing
provider is responsible for paying for and providing the
accommodation.6"
The case law discussed in this Essay presents the Commission's
interpretation of the reasonable accommodation provision of the
NYC Law.61 While housing providers have been obligated to pay
for and provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities in common areas of housing premises in New York City,
case law has not addressed who is responsible for paying for and
providing similar accommodations in the interior of these people's
homes. A continued effort on behalf of the Commission will be
necessary to expand upon the scope of protections afforded to persons with disabilities to ensure that interior modifications are provided, enabling access to the entire home.
Progress has been made with respect to this effort in a case that
was recently mediated by the Commission, where the housing provided agreed to pay for modifications to the complainant's bathroom and bedroom. These modifications enabled the
complainant's disabled son to use the bathroom and bedroom facilities.62 One mediated case, however, remains insufficient to clearly
define overall obligations of housing providers with respect to accommodations in the interior of the home. The hope, therefore, is
that one day soon, case law will be developed to construct this defi56. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1999);
Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1999).
57. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(3)(a) (McKinney 1999).
58. See id. § 296(3)(b).
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Raymond v. 325 Cooperative, 1999 WL 156021, at *2 (N.Y.C. Com.
Hum. Rts. Jan. 12, 1999).
61. See, e.g., id.; Torres v. Prince Management Corp., OATH Index #301/98 (Aug.
14, 1997), affd sub nom. Prince Management Corp. v. Varela, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1998
at 22, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.); United Veterans Mutual Housing No. 2 Corp. v. New
York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).
62. See Ilana Sheinman v. One Lincoln Plaza Condominium Board of Managers,
Conciliation Agreement, M-H-D-99-1006751 (Sept. 2, 1999).
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nition, and to enable persons with disabilities to have the reasonable accommodations necessary for the complete use and
enjoyment of their homes.

